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Abstract
Compared to inflation differentials among regions in the United States,
EMU inflation differentials are larger and more persistent. Based on 
augmented monetary policy reactions functions, this paper addresses the 
question whether the presence of pronounced inflation differentials in 
combination with low average inflation rates has influenced monetary 
policy decisions of the ECB. The paper finds statistical evidence that the 
ECB took inflation differentials into account which may reflect the fear of 
deflation in low inflation countries like Germany. 
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1. Introduction
Six years after the launch of the euro, inflation differentials among participating 
countries still exist. Although they converged in the run-up to European Monetary 
Union (EMU), they diverged around 1999, before they somewhat narrowed down again 
thereafter. Nevertheless, stylized facts show that inflation differentials within EMU 
remain larger and more persistent than those between regions of the United States and 
during the deutschmark era before 1999 between the different Länder of Germany. The 
European Central Bank (ECB) emphasizes that it pays due attention to the presence of 
inflation differentials within the euro area (ECB, 2003 and 2005). It can also be 
anticipated that the accession process further increases possible inflation differentials.
Potential reasons for the observed inflation differentials are manifold and have been 
extensively discussed in the literature (see, for example, Altissimo et al., 2005). 
Moreover, the economic consequences - positive or negative - have been highlighted 
(Hofmann and Remsperger, 2005). There seems to be a consensus that monetary policy 
within EMU cannot offset inflation differentials between member countries because 
there is no room for regional or national considerations. However, it may well be that 
the ECB, in deciding on its monetary policy, takes inflation differentials into account. 
Against this background, this paper examines the question whether the presence of 
relative pronounced inflation differentials has influenced the behavior of the ECB since 
the launch of the euro. With average inflation above target and considerable inflation 
differentials, some countries may experience quite low levels of inflations or even 
approach a situation of deflation. Then, although aggregate inflation calls for restrictive 
monetary policy, the ECB might have been reluctant because of the “fear of national 
deflation” with possible contagion effects spreading through the euro area.
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3
The rest of the paper has the following structure. Section 2 presents some stylized 
facts on inflation differentials in the euro area. Section 3 discusses possible causes of 
the observed inflation differentials. Section 4 includes measures of inflation differentials 
into interest rate reaction functions in order to find statistical evidence whether such 
differentials have influenced the interest rate policy of the ECB. Finally, section 5 
concludes.
2. Inflation Differentials in the Euro Area: Some Stylized Facts
Inflation differentials have significantly declined in the euro area in the run-up to EMU. 
Figure 1 shows that the unweighted cross-country standard deviation of annual national 
inflation rates measured by the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HIPC) has 
decreased significantly.1 Most of this process can be attributed to the process of 
convergence and reflects the fact that individual countries needed the reach lower rates 
of inflation in order to qualify for EMU. After establishing the EMU, the inflation 
differentials tended to increase again. As this was also a period when the aggregated 
rate of inflation in the euro area rose somewhat, one could expect that the increase in 
dispersion was mainly driven by an increase in levels. However, the data do not support
this view. The correlation between the standard deviation of inflation rates and the 
aggregate euro area inflation is about 0.18.2  Figure 1 also shows the inflation dispersion 
of the US measured by the unweighted standard deviation of inflation rates in the four 
US Census Regions Northeast, South, Midwest and West. The US standard deviation 
fluctuates around 0.5 percentage points, whereas the unweighted euro area standard 
1
 Alternative measures for the inflation dispersion are the weighted cross-country standard deviation, the 
maximum span of inflation rates, and the coefficient of variation. All these measures, however, display 
the same qualitative picture. See ECB (2003, Annex 1) for a discussion of possible divergence measures.
2
 The ECB (2003, p. 46) also expresses the view that there is no comovement in inflation rate levels and 
its dispersion.
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4
deviation is about twice as high since 1999.3 Regarding projections of the evolution of 
the inflation rate differentials, no clear cut picture emerges from fitting the data with 
detrending methods like a Hodrick-Prescott filter. Due to the usual endpoint problems 
of such methods, projections heavily depend on the chosen endpoint of the data series. 
Whether the inflation rate differentials within the EMU will converge to the levels 
observed in the US will depend on various structural features within the EMU. These 
are discussed in more details in the section 3. 
< INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE >
Inflation differentials in the euro area also appear to be more persistent than in the US in 
the sense that many countries have systematically maintained either a positive or a 
negative inflation gap against the euro area average since the introduction of the euro. 
Table 1 shows the national inflation differentials against the euro area average. It 
reveals that, since 1999, seven out of twelve countries have inflation rates that are 
constantly either above or below the euro area average. Some of the differentials are of 
relative large size (i.e., larger than one percentage point) over prolonged periods of 
time. Looking at the US, inflation differentials larger than one percentage point and 
lasting for more than two years have occurred only in a few specific cases. This leads 
the ECB to the statement that “[t]he persistence of inflation differentials seems, thus, to 
be a specific feature of the euro area” (ECB, 2005, p. 63).
3
 An alternative available measure for the US inflation dispersion is the unweigthed standard deviation of 
CPI inflation for 14 metropolitan areas. This measure is somewhat higher than for the four Census 
Regions (see ECB, 2005, Chart 1). However, since these metropolitan areas are much smaller than most 
euro area countries, the four Census Regions are probably the more appropriate base for a comparison.
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< INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE >
The differences between inflation rates among euro area countries also involve an 
important sectoral dimension. The HICP consists of five main sub-components: 
services, non-energy industrial goods, energy, processed food, and unprocessed food. 
Due to their high weights, about two thirds of the overall HICP consist of the first two 
sub-components. According to an analysis of the ECB (2005), the service sector shows 
50 percent more inflation dispersion than the sector of non-energy industrial goods, 
which reveals that, within the euro area, cross-country inflation differentials in the 
tradable sector are much lower than differentials in the services sector.4 However, the 
available evidence by and large indicates that there is no one single factor that explains 
the existence and the persistence of inflation differentials in the euro area. The 
following section provides a survey on the potential origins of the inflation differentials.
3.  Causes of Inflation Differentials within a Currency Area
In this section, we briefly discuss possible causes of inflation differentials in a monetary 
union and, in turn, the potential economic consequences that arise from them. 
Identifying the underlying causes of inflation differentials is not an easy task, because in 
a large monetary union like the euro area, a number of factors are likely to contribute to 
the observed inflation differentials. Three types of factors can be distinguished: 
transitory factors related to the process of convergence; permanent factors related to 
national economic structures; and policy-induced factors related to diverging national 
policies or to divergent regional responses to euro area-wide policies. 
4
 See also ECB (2003, p. 6).
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6
Transitory factors related to the process of convergence among EMU members have 
contributed and are still likely to contribute in the near future to the dispersion of 
inflation rates in the euro area. This is the case for at least three reasons. First, the 
convergence of nominal and real interest rates among the countries to levels that 
previously were observed only in the low inflation countries before EMU together with 
the high degree of capital market integration within the euro area may has contributed to 
a surge in aggregate demand in the formerly high interest rate countries. This has 
exerted sustained upward pressure on prices, particular in the non-tradable and services 
sector (ECB, 2005). Second, the implementation of the Single European Market 
together with the introduction of a single currency has certainly contributed to a marked 
decline in price level dispersion, mainly in the tradable goods sector. This convergence 
is likely to have contributed to some degree to the inflation differentials at least in the 
first years of EMU. Rogers (2002) estimates that the price level dispersion in 1999 
contributed to the observed annual HICP inflation dispersion at the end of 2002 and 
amounted to around 16 percent of the overall inflation dispersion. Third, the Balassa-
Samuelson effect (BSE) might have also contributed to the inflation dispersion in EMU. 
Even with tradable goods prices being similar in EMU member countries, productivity 
differences account for differences in nontradable goods prices and, thus, for differences 
in overall inflation rates. However, as productivity convergence has already been 
substantial in EMU, the size of the BSE for the current member countries is likely to 
diminish over time and recent calculations suggest that its size is fairly small.5
5
 See, for example, the annual report of the “Sachverständigenrat” – the German Council of Economic 
Advisors – for 2001. See additionally ECB (2003, p. 32 Table 5) for a summary of available studies. 
Those studies, however, consider periods prior to the EMU and tend to overstate to actual contribution of 
the BSE, since productivity convergence was considerably stronger prior to the EMU. On average, the 
studies imply that the BSE results in a standard deviation of 0.6.
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7
Nevertheless, it may become more relevant in the future when new EU member 
countries join EMU.
Permanent factors related to national economic structures may have also contributed 
to inflation differentials in EMU. One such structural factor relates to national 
differences in the consumption preferences among households. This heterogeneity in 
preferences is reflected in the fact that the shares of the various goods and services in 
national consumption and value added differ between member countries. Consequently, 
they have different weights in the various sub-indices of the national HICPs.6 Since the 
same product has different weights in the respective national HICP, a pure ‘composition 
effect’ can, thus, lead to different inflation rates even if individual product prices show 
the same dynamics. However, empirical evidence indicates that this factor constitutes 
only a relatively minor reason for the inflation dispersion. The German Council of 
Academic Advisers (Sachverständigenrat, 2001) calculated that the ‘composition effect’ 
explains only 2 percent of the measured inflation variance in the euro area in 2000. 
Another structural feature that is likely to contribute to the divergence of inflation 
rates is the degree of openness, and related to this the composition of EMU-external 
trade. According to this argument, countries within EMU face different inflationary 
pressure from exchange rate depreciation and/or from a price increase of imported 
goods and raw material. Indeed, Honohan and Lane (2003) find that country-specific 
exchange rate effects matter to some degree for inflation differentials.7 More generally, 
6
 For example, the category ‘meat’ has a weight of 3 percent in the Austrian HICP and 5.5 percent in the 
Spanish HICP.
7 Employing pass-through regressions Campa/Gonzalez/Minuez (2006) find that differences in the degree 
of transmission of a common exchange rate movement into consumer prices among the euro area 
countries do exist. For example, they calculate an average pass-through rate to consumer prices for the 
euro area to be about 0.5 with country-specific rates that range from 0.2 for Italy to 1.5 for Ireland. 
Furthermore, they demonstrate that most of the differences among member countries are due to the 
distinct degree of openness rather than to the heterogeneity in the structure of imports. In an applied 
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8
the process of adjustment to changing economic conditions is a source of inflation 
differentials in the euro area. If the degree of price and wage rigidities which are 
responsible for the path of adjustment differs between EMU members the inflation 
dynamics will also differ. Empirical evidence of the quantitative importance of these 
rigidities is rarely available and is a focus of current research (see Angeloni et al., 
2004).8
The last group of reasons for inflation differentials consists of policy-related factors. 
Both area-wide and regional policies might contribute to the degree of heterogeneity in 
the euro area. In particular, fiscal policy is such a source. For example, changes in 
administered prices, which account for about 6 percent of the HICP, and changes in 
indirect taxes can contribute to inflation differentials at least in the short run. In 
addition, the use of national fiscal instruments potentially reinforces inflation 
differentials. Finally, monetary policy, although centralized in EMU, can contribute to 
inflation dispersion via different transmission across member countries, e.g. through 
different structures of the banking sector. Clausen and Hayo (2006), for example, find 
evidence for asymmetries in the interest rate transmission within the EMU for France, 
Germany and Italy.
In sum, inflation differences can arise for a variety of reasons. However, it is widely 
recognized that assigning monetary policy the role of directly addressing these inflation 
differentials would clearly overburden a central bank. However, central banks might 
take into account the issue of inflation differentials more indirectly. The ECB (2003, p. 
6) states: 
analysis Cunningham/Haldane (2002) use calibrated simulations to demonstrate the impact of alternative 
specifications of import-price pass-through on the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
8
 In a semi-structural modelling approach Clausen and Hayo (2006) find asymmetries in the effects of 
output gaps on inflation within EMU member countries. This can also be seen as an indication for the 
existence of structural differences in the EMU.
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9
“A particular concern for the ECB`s monetary policy strategy is to avoid 
that the presence of unavoidable inflation differentials […] could push lower-
inflation regions within the euro area towards inflation levels that could 
complicate the process of economic adjustment in the presence of downward 
nominal rigidities. Therefore, the ECB’s monetary policy strategy attributes a 
secondary role to inflation differentials when calibrating the safety margin for 
admissible inflation in the euro area. In this respect, the ECB’s explicit aim of 
maintaining euro area inflation below but close to 2% is regarded as sufficient to 
address those concerns.”
This quote indicates that the ECB is indeed concerned about inflation differentials in 
the euro area and attributes a “secondary role” to them. Motivated by this observation, 
the subsequent section examines the ECB’s monetary policy in order to identify 
statistically robust responses of the ECB to the observed inflation differentials. 
4. The Reaction of the ECB to Inflation Differentials
All major central banks in industrial countries currently conduct monetary policy by 
using market-oriented instruments in order to influence the short-term interest rate 
(Borio, 1997). Since the seminal paper of Taylor (1993), it has become common to 
describe this interest setting behavior of central banks in terms of monetary policy 
reaction functions. In its plain form, the so-called Taylor rule states that the short-term 
interest rate which, in this analysis, represents the instrument of a central bank reacts to 
deviations of inflation and output from their respective targets. Clarida et al. (1998) 
proposed a forward-looking variant of the Taylor rule which takes into account the pre-
emptive nature of monetary policy as well as interest smoothing behavior of central 
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banks. This particular type of reaction function has become very popular in applied 
empirical research on Taylor rules. A number of studies demonstrated that the ECB’s 
monetary policy over the course of the first years of single monetary policy in the euro 
area can also satisfactory be explained by this kind of reaction functions. Among them 
are Fendel/Frenkel (2006), Fourçans/Vranceanu (2004), and Hayo/Hofmann (2006).9
Following Clarida et al. (1998) the baseline policy rule takes the form:
(1) *)(*)(* 21 qtqttktt yyEEii +++ ++=  ,
where i* is the desired level of the nominal short-term interest rate, and i  is its long-run 
equilibrium level. The second term on the right-hand side is the expected deviation of 
the k-period ahead inflation rate () from the target rate (*) which is assumed to be 
constant over time. The third term is the expected deviation of output (y) from its 
natural level (y*) q periods ahead (i.e., the output gap). The coefficients 1  and 2
represent the intensity with which the desired interest rate of the central bank reacts to 
the inflation and the output gap. The assumption of interest rate smoothing behavior 
leads to
(2) tttt iii  ++= 1*)1( , 
 
9 Altavilla/Landolfo (2005) use a Markov-switching approach in order to analyze whether the ECB reacts 
asymmetrically. The authors do indeed find that the phase of the business cycle is an important matter in 
the ECB’s monetary policy decisions. Furthermore, Fendel/Frenkel (2005) employ augmented monetary 
policy reaction functions and show that the ECB also takes into account information from the term 
structure of interest rates.
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where the parameter   (with 10 <	  ) describes the degree of interest rate smoothing 
behavior and t  represents an i.i.d. exogenous random shock to the interest rate. 
Combining (1) and (2) leads to 
(3) ( ) ttqtqttkttt iyyEEii  ++++= +++ 121 *)(*)()1( .
In order to arrive at a testable relationship, the unobservable terms in equation (3) have 
to be eliminated. Therefore, we rewrite equation (3) as:
(4) ( ) ttqtqtktt iyyi  ++++= +++ 1210 *)1()1()1( ,
where
*10  = i    and   ( ) ( )qttqtkttkttt yEyE ++++ = )1()1( 21  .
Furthermore, we assume that
(5) [ ] 0=ttt IE  .
Here It is the central bank’s information set available at time t. Equation (5) simply 
states that the central bank uses its best possible guess about future inflation and output 
in its interest rate decisions.
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In order to estimate equation (4), we employ the following data. The sample 
period is 1999:01 to 2005:06. For euro area output, we use monthly data on industrial 
production taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics. The short-term interest 
rate is the EONIA (European Overnight Index Average) as reported by the ECB. 
Inflation is measured by the HCPI provided by Eurostat. The output gap is based on 
natural output calculated by a linear trend.10
Following the common approach of the literature for testing reaction functions, 
we implement the GMM estimation methodology using the correction for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form.11 In addition, we chose Bartlett 
weights to ensure positive definiteness of our estimated variance-covariance matrix. We 
set k =12 and q = 3 in equation (4) and use the constant as well as the lagged values of 
the output gap and the inflation rate and the short-term interest rate as the core set of 
instruments.12 Specification (1) in Table 2 displays the forward-looking Taylor rule in 
its conventional form as shown in equation (4). All parameters are in the expected 
range. In particular, the reaction coefficient on inflation is greater than unity, indicating 
that the Taylor principle holds. We use this result as our benchmark.
<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE>
10
 We find that that monetary policy reaction functions for the ECB are robust against changes in 
detrending method. This confirms the result of Fendel/Frenkel (2005).
11
 Huang/Lin (2006) propose an alternative estimation approach based on a dynamic ordered probit model 
with time-varying parameters carried out via recent advances in Bayesian simulation approach, namely, 
the Markov chain Monte Carlo.
12 More specifically, we use the first six lags as well as the ninth and the twelfth lag of the output gap and 
the first, the third, the sixth, the ninth and the twelfth lag of the short term interest rate and the inflation 
gap. This instrument set displays the core set of instruments that is present throughout all subsequent 
regressions. In the following we only report the instruments that we add the this core set of instruments in 
particular regressions. The J-statistics which are not reported here indicate that we chose a valid set of 
instruments for all subsequent regressions.
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Starting from the benchmark regression, we include in additional estimations a
measure of inflation differentials. To this end, we proceed along two alternative 
avenues. The first one is to modify the EMU average inflation gap measure in equation 
(4) when inflation differentials occur. The second avenue is to include an explicit 
measure of divergence as an individual explanatory variable in the reaction function.
We start with the first and indirect way of accounting for inflation divergence and 
calculate two different measures for the “divergence-adjusted inflation gap”.  The first 
measure is calculated by dividing the expected inflation gap of regression (1) by one 
plus the actual unweighted standard deviation of inflation. A standard deviation of zero 
would then mean that we divide the aggregate inflation gap by one, which leaves it 
unchanged. The higher the standard deviation is, the smaller is the modified inflation 
gap. Hence, higher inflation divergence then translates into a smaller inflation gap in the 
reaction function.
Why should larger inflation divergence have the same effect on the behavior of a 
central bank as a lower inflation rate? Imagine a monetary union in which all members 
have an expected inflation rate of, say, three percent. Given a target rate of inflation of, 
say, two percent, the aggregate inflation gap is one percent and the central bank then 
probably applies some restrictive monetary policy measures. Now imagine again an 
aggregate expected inflation rate of three percent but with the following distribution of 
inflation rates among member countries of the currency union: 50 percent of the 
member countries display an inflation rate of three percent, 25 percent a rate of 5 
percent and the remaining 25 percent a rate of unity. Although the aggregate measure is 
identical as in the first case considered above, one could expect that the central bank is 
more reluctant to close the inflation gap in the second case, because applying restrictive 
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policy measures could lead to deflation in the low inflation countries.13 Thus, the ECB 
cannot counteract inflation divergence directly through monetary measures but it could 
respond differently to aggregate inflation in the presence of inflation differentials. 
Regression (2) in Table 2 reports the estimation results based on the modified 
inflation gap. The reaction coefficient of this estimate is still significant. This can be 
interpreted as support for the effect of inflation differentials on the behavior of the ECB 
as outlined above. We also calculate a second measure of the “divergence-adjusted 
inflation gap”. This measure is calculated by dividing the expected inflation gap of 
regression (1) by one plus the coefficient of variation. The estimation of the reaction 
function that uses this modified inflation gap is shown as regression (3) in Table 2. The 
results show that the reaction coefficient remains significant indicating the robustness of 
the result.
Since the value of R2 from regression (1), which is already very high, does not 
change significantly when including the modified inflation measures in regressions (2) 
and (3), it is not possible to finally judge whether the new inflation variables contribute 
to the explanatory power of the model. However, the high R2 seems to be mainly driven 
by the presence of the smoothing term. Although including the smoothing term is
consistent with the standard formulation for monetary policy reaction functions, we also 
examine alternative formulations that do not allow for interest rate smoothing. We 
instead use the change in the interest rate as the left-hand side variable which is then 
explained by a constant, the expected inflation gap and the expected output gap:
13
 The Japanese experience points to adverse effects of deflation so that a “fear of deflation” seems 
justified. Among others, Morana (2005) argues that monetary policy played a pivotal role for Japanese 
deflation and that a more expansionary monetary policy stance of the Bank of Japan could have stopped 
the deflation in Japan.
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(6) ( ) tqtqtkttt yyii  +++= +++ *2101
where
*10  = i   and   ( ) ( )qttqtkttkttt yEyE ++++ = 21  .
Table 3 presents the results. Since we consider the regressions in Table 3 as 
complements to the specifications in Table 2 we denote corresponding specifications 
with the same number but add an “a” to denote “alternative”. All coefficients are again 
significant and of the expected sign, i.e., positive, for the inflation variable and the 
output variable. Due to the missing smoothing parameter, the R2 values are much 
smaller compared to the standard formulations in Table 2. However, comparing their 
sizes shows that using the modified measures of the inflation gap in specifications (2a) 
and (3a) improves the overall explanatory power of the model.14
< INSERT TABLE 3 HERE >
Judging whether the reaction to the expected inflation gap becomes indeed more 
reluctant given the information of a higher divergence of actual inflation rates is not 
possible from the regressions in Tables 2 and 3. Given that the coefficient of the 
inflation is significant in both the benchmark and in the modified specification, we can 
14 We also re-estimated the regressions based on formulation (4) and forced the smoothing parameter  to
be zero. As the R2 values of the estimations (using the three alternative inflation measures) are
significantly lower than for the specifications in Table 3, we do not present the results here. However, 
also in these cases an improvement in the R2 when employing the modified measures for the inflation gap 
was also present.
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only say that including inflation diversion in the inflation gap does not deteriorate the 
Taylor rule estimates. However, it does not yet show which way the ECB reacts to 
inflation differentials. In order to find out the sign of reaction of the ECB we need to 
proceed along the second route and add a measure of divergence as an individual 
explanatory variable. We therefore augment the benchmark regression equation (4) by 
adding a measure of inflation divergence (Divt+l) as a separate variable according to:
(7) ( ) ttltqtqtktt iDivyyi  +++++= ++++ 13210 )1(*)1()1()1( ,
where
( ) ( ) ( ).)1()1()1( 321 lttltqttqtkttkttt DivEDivyEyE ++++++ = 
In contrast to regressions (2) and (3), we allow for a forward-looking specification of 
the divergence measure. We use four different measures of inflation divergence and 
show the results in Table 4.
<INSERT TABLE 4 HERE>
Regression (4) uses the 12-month ahead unweighted standard deviation of the inflation 
rates of the euro area countries as a measure of divergence. The reaction coefficient of 
the divergence measure is significantly negative. The inflation reaction coefficient stays 
significantly positive, but displays a far larger value compared to the benchmark 
regression. The negative coefficient for the divergence measure can be interpreted in the 
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following way: higher expected inflation divergence makes the ECB more reluctant to 
raise interest rates for any given level of expected inflation gap. This result turns out to 
be robust to changes in the divergence measure. In specification (5), we use the squared 
standard deviation in order to account for possible non-linearity in the ECB’s reaction 
towards divergence. Specifications (6) and (7) include the coefficient of variation in 
linear and squared form, respectively. Again, the “reluctance-effect” is significant.15
We also re-estimate the specifications (4) through (7) by excluding the smoothing 
term and use the change in the interest rate as the left-hand side variable instead. As 
before, excluding the smoothing term allows us to better proof the additional 
explanatory power of the inflation divergence term. The results are shown in Table 5. 
All parameters are again significant and of the expected sign. The R2 values indicate 
again that the inflation differentials have additional explanatory power, particularly in 
squared form.
<INSERT TABLE 5 HERE>
We also examine whether the reluctance effect described before has been present 
from the very beginning of EMU. To this end, we re-estimate the previous 
specifications for the sub-period of 1999:01 to 2003:05. The endpoint of this period 
coincides with the announcement of the redefinition of the ECB`s strategy, which –
according to the statement of the ECB – should address the issue of inflation divergence 
15
 On top of the core set of instruments we instrument the expected standard deviation of inflation rates 
and the expected coefficient of variation rates by their first six lags, respectively. For the squared forms of 
the two divergence measures we add a one before squaring them because they contain values smaller than 
unity. We also tried the contemporaneous divergence measures in some additional regressions but the 
effects were not significant in those cases and we, therefore, abstain from reporting them.
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coupled with the fear of (national) deflation. Table 6 presents the estimation results 
based on the coefficient of variation as the measure of inflation divergence.16
<INSERT TABLE 6 HERE>
Regression (8) corresponds to the benchmark regression (1) and shows a significant 
response to the expected inflation gap according to the Taylor principle. However, 
employing the “divergence-adjusted inflation gap” in specification (9) shows a less 
significant effect for the sub-sample. The direct inclusion of the divergence measure in a 
linear as well as in a quadratic form in specifications (10) and (11) turns out to be 
statistically insignificant.17 These results provide some indication that the “reluctance 
effect” in the ECB’s interest rate setting behavior was not present from the very 
beginning but emerged in the course of declining aggregate inflation rates.18
5. Conclusions
Our study examines whether inflation differentials may have had an effect on how the 
ECB responded to inflation gaps in the euro area. We use different ways of how 
inflation differentials could be taken into account in a central bank’s reaction function 
and also examine whether the behavior of the ECB has been the same from the
beginning. The results point indeed to an influence of inflation differentials on monetary 
policy in the euro area. With higher inflation divergence, the ECB was more reluctant to 
16
 We also performed the regressions based on the unweighted standard variation but results turned out to 
be quite identical. For the sake of brevity, these results are not presented.
17
 Again the first six lags of the divergence measure were employed as additional instruments in 
regressions (10) and (11).
18
 We also tested more explicitly for the presence of structural breaks over the whole sample period but 
did not get statistically robust results of a regime shift. The same results were obtained when we 
examined the specification in the alternative form with interest rate differences on the left-hand side.
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fight an overall inflation gap. A possible reason could be that the ECB feared that 
restrictive monetary policy could easily lead to deflation in low-inflation countries if it 
took a very tough stance on fighting overall inflation. This view is supported by our 
finding that the ECB displayed this “reluctance effect” particularly in more recent years 
during which some member countries of the euro area had inflation rates that, once 
adjusted for the causes of a bias (e.g., quality effects and the influence of new products) 
were already close to zero. 
A task for future research is to develop a theoretical macro model that starts from a 
central bank loss that explicitly incorporates to inflation differential to derive an optimal 
interest rate rule that also includes such a variable. Along the same lines, calibrated 
exercises could be performed to verify how a greater or a smaller differential affects the 
reaction coefficients.
Page 20 of 28
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
20
References
Altavilla, C. and Landolfo, L. (2005) Do central banks react asymmetrically? Empirical 
evidence from the ECB an the Bank of England, Applied Economics, 37, 509-517.
Altissimo, F., Benigno, P. and Palenzuela D. R. (2005) Long-Run Determinats of 
Inflation Differentials in a Monetary Union, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5149, 
London.
Angeloni, I. and Ehrmann, M. (2004) Euro area inflation differentials, ECB Working 
Paper No. 388, Frankfurt.
Angeloni, I., Aucremanne, L., Ehrmann, M., Galí, J., Levin, A. and Smets F. (2004) 
Inflation persistence in the euro area: preliminary summary of findings, paper 
presented at the conference “Inflation persistence in the euro area”, Frankfurt, 10.-
11. December 2004.
Balassa, B. (1964) The purchasing power parity doctrine: a reappraisal, The Journal of 
Political Economy, 72, 584-96.
Borio, C. E. V. (1997) The implementation of monetary policy in industrial countries: A 
survey, BIS Economic Papers No. 47, July 1997.
Campa, J.M. and Gonzalez Minguez J.M. (2006) Differences in the Exchange Rate 
Pass-Through in the Euro Area, European Economic Review, 50, 121-145. 
Clausen, V. and Hayo, B. (2006) Asymmetric monetary policy effects in EMU, Applied 
Economics, 38, 1123-1134.
Clarida, R., Gali, J. and Gertler M. (1998), Monetary Policy Rules in Practice: Some 
International Evidence, European Economic Review, 42, 1033-67.
Cunningham, A. and Haldane, A.G. (2002) The monetary transmission mechanism in 
the United Kingdom: pass-through and policy rules, in: Loayza, N. and K. Schmidt-
Hebbel (eds.), Monetary Policy: Rules and Transmission Mechanism, Central Bank 
of Chile, Santiago, 331-356.
ECB (2003) Inflation Differentials in the Euro Area: Potential Causes and Policy 
Implications, Frankfurt am Main, September 2003.
ECB (2005) Monetary Policy and Inflation Differentials in a Heterogeneous Currency 
Area, ECB Monthly Bulletin, May 2005, 61-77.
Page 21 of 28
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
21
Fendel, R. and Frenkel, M. (2006) Five Years of European Single Monetary Policy: Is 
the ECB Rule-based?, Contemporary Economic Policy, 24, 106-115
Fendel, R. and Frenkel, M. (2005), Monetary Policy Rules and the Information Content 
of the Term Structure of Interest Rates, Applied Economics Letters, 12, 933-936
Fourçans, A. and Vranceanu, R (2004), The ECB interest rate rule under the Duisenberg 
presidency, European Journal of Political Economy, 20, 579-95.
Hayo, B and Hofmann, B. (2006) Monetary Policy Reaction Functions: ECB versus 
Bundesbank, Empirical Economics, 31, 645-662.
Hofmann, B. and Remsperger H. (2005) Inflation Differentials among the Euro Area 
Countries: Potential Causes and Consequences, mimeo, Deutsche Bundesbank.
Honohan, P. and Lane P. (2003), Divergent Inflation Rates in EMU, Economic Policy, 
18, 358-394.
Huang, H.-C. and Lin, S.-C. (2006) Time-varying discrete monetary policy functions, 
Applied Economics, 38, 449-464.
Morana, C. (2005) The Japanese deflation: Has it had real effects? Could it have been 
avoided?, Applied Economics, 37, 1337-1352.
Rogers, J. (2002) Monetary union, price level convergence, and inflation: how close is 
Europe to the United States?, International Finance Discussion Paper No. 740, 
Federal Reserve Board, New York.
Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Lage (2001), 
Inflationsdifferenzen im Euro-Raum: ein Problem für die Geldpolitik?, 
Jahresgutachten 2001/2002, 267-77.
Samuelson, P. (1964), Theoretical notes on trade problems, Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 46, 245-54.
Taylor, J. B. (1993) Discretion versus policy rules in practice, Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference Series on Public Policy, 39, 195-214.
Page 22 of 28
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
22
Figure 1: Dispersion of Inflation Rates in the euro Area and the US, 1996 – 2004
(unweighted standard deviation, quarterly data)
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Table 1: Differentials in Annual HICP Inflation Relative to Euro Area Average
(in percentage points)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Belgium 0.0 0.6 0.1 -0,7 -0.6 -0.3 0.3
Germany -0.5 -0.7 -0.4 -0.9 -1.0 -0.4 -0.3
Greece 1.0 0.8 1.3 1.7 1.4 0.9 1.3
Spain 1.1 1.4 0.5 1.3 1.0 0.9 1.2
France -0.6 -0.3 -0.6 -0.3 0.1 0.2 -0.3
Ireland 1.3 3.2 1.6 2.5 1.9 0.2 0.1
Italy 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.7 0.1 0.1
Luxembourg -0.1 1.7 0.1 -0.2 0.5 1.1 1.6
Netherlands 0.9 0.2 2.8 1.6 0.2 -0.8 -0.7
Austria -0.6 -0.1 0.0 -0.6 -0.8 -0.2 -0.1
Portugal 1.0 0.7 2.1 1.4 1.2 0.4 0.0
Finland 0.2 0.8 0.3 -0.2 -0.8 -2.0 -1.4
Source: European Central Bank 
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Table 2: Standard Taylor Rule Estimation Results
Coefficient Regression (1) Regression (2) Regression (3)
 (smoothing parameter) 0.861***
(0.017) 
0.889***
(0.014) 
0.850***
(0.013) 
0 (constant) - 1.258
(1.088) 
- 0.263
(1.010) 
0.055
(0.792) 
1 (inflationt+12) 1.672***
(0.476)
1 (inflationt+12/(1+ std.devt) 2.285***
(0.861) 
 
1 (inflationt+12/(1+ coef. of vart) 1.483***
(0.487)
2 (output gapt+3) 0.576***
(0.051) 
0.773***
(0.047)
0.637***
(0.06)
No. of observations 66 66 66
Adj. R2 0.961 0.975 0.968
DW 1.605 1.784 1.494
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at a level of 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively.
Instruments in all regressions are a constant, the first six lags as well as the ninth and the twelfth lag 
of the output gap and the first, the third, the sixth, the ninth and the twelfth lag of the short term 
interest rate and the inflation gap.
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Table 3: Regressions Based on the Change in the Short-term Interest Rate
Left-hand side variable: 
change in the interest rate
Regression 
(1a)
Regression 
(2a)
Regression 
(3a)
0 (constant) -0.372**
(0.164) 
- 0.336***
(0.107)
-0.143**
(0.058)
1 (inflationt+12) 0.163**
(0.075) 
 
1 (inflationt+12/(1+ std.devt) 0.280***
(0.098) 
 
1 (inflationt+12/(1+ coef. of vart) 0.256**
(0.115)
2 (output gapt+3) 0.021**
(0.010) 
0.031***
(0.007)
0.018**
(0.009)
No. of observations 66 66 66
Adj. R2 0.221 0.262 0.263
DW 2.029 2.117 2.031
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at a level of 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively.
Instruments in all regressions are a constant, the first six lags as well as the ninth and the twelfth lag 
of the output gap and the first, the third, the sixth, the ninth and the twelfth lag of the inflation gap.
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Table 4: Results of Augmented Regressions
Coefficient Regression (4) Regression (5) Regression (6) Regression (7)
 (smoothing parameter) 0.911***
(0.014) 
0.920***
(0.019)
0.909***
(0.019)
0.911***
(0.020) 
0 (constant) - 3.253**
(1.588) 
3.995***
(0.946)
2.872
(4.164) 
13.913**
(6.367)
1 (inflationt+12) 3.919***
(0.966)
3.938***
(1.428)
2.96**
(1.32)
2.701**
(1.371) 
2 (output gapt+3) 0.703***
(0.100)
0.708***
(0.109)
0.604***
(0.118)
0.625***
(0.124) 
3 (std.devt+12) - 3.196***
(1.186)
3 ([1+std.devt+12] ^2) - 1.157***
(0.438)
3 (coef. of var.t+12) - 16.963**
(8.644) 
 
3 ([1+coef. of var.t+12]^2) - 6.719**
(3.275) 
No. of observations 66 66 66 66
Adj. R2 0.965 0.975 0.968 0.968
DW 1.650 1.699 1.426 1.430
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at a level of 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively.
The following instruments were used in all regressions: a constant, the first six lags as well as the ninth and 
the twelfth lag of the output gap and the first, the third, the sixth, the ninth and the twelfth lag of the short 
term interest rate and the inflation gap. Regressions (4) and (5) additionally contain the first six lags of the 
standard deviation of inflation rates. Regressions (6) and (7) additionally contain the first six lags of the 
coefficient of variation of inflation rates.
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Table 5: Results of Augmented Regressions Based on the Change in the Short-term 
Interest Rate
Left-hand side variable: 
change in the interest rate
Regression 
(4a)
Regression 
(5a)
Regression 
(6a)
Regression 
(7a)
0 (constant) - 0.131
(0.204)
-0.128
(0.204)
-0.171
(0.178) 
0.056
(0.266) 
1 (inflationt+12) 0.156***
(0.063) 
0.156***
(0.063) 
0.191***
(0.051) 
0.179***
(0.061) 
2 (output gapt+3) 0.031***
(0.011) 
0.031***
(0.011) 
0.019***
(0.007)
0.021**
(0.009)
3 (std.devt+12) - 0.227***
(0.088) 
 
3 ([1+std.devt+12] ^2) - 0.057***
(0.021) 
 
3 (coef. of var.t+12) - 0.707**
(0.307)
3 ([1+coef. of var.t+12]^2) - 0.247**
(0.113) 
No. of observations 66 66 66 66
Adj. R2 0.251 0.273 0.311 0.303
DW 2.237 2.252 2.179 2.181
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at a level of 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively.
The following instruments were used in all regressions: a constant, the first six lags as well as the ninth and 
the twelfth lag of the output gap and the first, the third, the sixth, the ninth and the twelfth lag of the inflation 
gap. Regressions (4a) and (5a) additionally contain the first six lags of the standard deviation of inflation 
rates. Regressions (6a) and (7a) additionally contain the first six lags of the coefficient of variation of 
inflation rates.
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Table 6: Results for Sub-Sample 1999:01 to 2003:05
Coefficient Regression (8) Regression (9) Regression (10) Regression (11)
 (smoothing parameter) 0.822***
(0.041) 
0.879***
(0.014)
0.853***
(0.029)
0.855***
(0.029)
0 (constant) - 2.402
(2.162) 
1.180
(0.886)
0.331
(2.849)
2.163
(3.706)
1 (inflationt+12) 2.688***
(1.015) 
 2.211**
(0.985)
2.197**
(0.999)
1 (inflationt+12/(1+coef. of var.t) 0.962*
(0.549)
2 (output gapt+3) 0.305***
(0.081) 
0.645***
(0.059)
0.409***
(0.066)
0.413***
(0.0672)
3 (coef. of var.t+12) - 5.043
(3.521) 
 
3 ([1+coef. of var.t+12]^2) - 1.947
(1.278) 
No. of observations 53 53 53 53
Adj. R2 0.916 0.964 0.934 0.934
DW 1.072 2.176 1.397 1.404
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at a level of 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively.
The following instruments were used in all regressions: a constant, the first six lags as well as the ninth and the twelfth lag 
of the output gap and the first, the third, the sixth, the ninth and the twelfth lag of the short term interest rate and the 
inflation gap. Regressions (10) and (11) additionally contain the first six lags of the coefficient of variation of inflation 
rates.
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